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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
HILDA A. BRIMM, 
Plaintiff and Respondent 
vs. 
CACHE VALLEY BANKING CO. 
a corporation, ADMINISTRATOR 
OF THE ESTATE OF ANDREW 
ANDERSEN, AKA, ANDREW 
ANDERSON, Deceased. 
Defendant and Appellant. 
ARGUMENT 
Case No. 7979 
APPELLANT'S 
REPLY BRIEF 
Point No. 1. The court erred in finding and holding 
that the water rights represented by certificate No. 24, for 
112 shares of the Capital Stock of the Mendon Central 
Irrigation Company, a corpo-ration, is appurtenant to the 
lands described in the findings and decree. 
On page 3 of respondent's brief it is contended that 
the stock certificate ( Def' s. Ex. 4) is invalid because 
Andrew Andersen did not own any land when the Mendon 
Central Irrigation Company was organized. On page 2 
of the abstract of Title, (Pis. Ex. A) there is a deed from 
Andrew Sorensen, Mayor of Mendon City, to Andrew 
Andersen, conveying to him 17.63 acres; and on page .t 
there appears a deed from Kelsey Bird, et. ux. conveying 
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to him the 2/110 acre tract. On page 7 of abstract (Ex. 
"A"), there appears a Inortgage dated November 22, 1893, 
whereby Andrew and Sophia Andersen, mortgaged this 
property to James Quayle and Company to secure a debt 
of $750. This mortgage was cancelled on September 17, 
1895, and apparently a deed to this property was substi-
tuted as appears on page 8 of (Ex. A) and, when the debt 
was paid, the property was deeded to Sophia. And on 
July 23, 1918, and after the Mendon Central Irrigation 
Company was incorporated, and the stock certificate 
(De£' s. Ex. -!) was issued and delivered to Andrew Ander-
sen, he executed a second deed to her, for the 2/110 acres. 
But sections 315, Compiled laws of Utah, 1907, and 
section 861, Compiled law of Utah 1917, did not specifi-
cally provide that an incorporator must own any particular 
property at time of incorporation. The statute requires 
( 3) "The names of the incorporators and their places of 
residence; ( 7) The amount of stock each party has sub- . 
scribed; and, ( 8) the amount of each share and the limit 
of capital stock agreed upon." In Article 7 of the Articles 
of Incorporation, the names of the incorporators are listed, 
with their places of residence, and the amount of stock 
subscribed by each, with value of each share. 
In view of the fact that the Corporate stock was fully 
paid by a transfer of the waters of the springs, and Andrew 
and Sophia, joined in the execution of Def's. Ex. 1, the 
Deed of Water Rights, then the water which was prior 
thereto appurtenant to their land, was conveyed and trans-
ferred to the Corporation, in full con1pliance with the pro-
visions of section 862, Compiled Law of Utah, 1917. When 
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5 
this deed was delivered to the officers of the Corporation, 
it was their duty to issue the stock certificate to Andrew 
Anderse~, as one of the incorporators. 
But for the sake of Argument, suppose Sophia Ander-
sen had been one of the incorporators, and the certificate 
was issued to her and she died leaving the stock in her 
name, then it would be necessary to probate her estate, 
and the same heirs at law would be effected. Therefore, 
it is difficult to perceive the materiality of Coimsel's Con-
tention on page 3 of respondent's brief. 
On pages four, five and six of respondent's brief, coun-
sel refers to the conveyances and transfers of the land 
described in plaintiff's complaint. It is also mentioned 
that said land had been irrigated, from waters represented 
by the stock issued to Andrew Andersen. It is difficult to 
perceive how that is material to any issue in this case. 
Even assuming that it was the same water it was merely a 
gratuitious use. He also emphasizes that the land is of 
little value without water. Assuming these facts to be 
true it does not justify the confiscation of private property. 
There are many instances where one person is permitted 
to use .the property of another for various periods of time, 
but that alone does not constitute a transfer of title to the 
property. 
On page 9 of respondent's brief, Counsel states that -
"Under our decisions water is 'appurtenant', if water is 
used in direct connection with the real estate conveyed,"-
citing Thompson vs. McKinney 63 P. 2nd. 1056. From an 
examination of the opinion in that case it will be seen that 
the water was not owned by a corporation, as appears from 
the following excerpt from the opinion: 
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"There was no corporation or other organization by 
which shares of stock were issued. There is no 
question in this case respecting water rights repre-
sented by shares of stock in a corporation." 
It is contended on page 9, that the decision in George 
vs. Robison has been overruled by In re Johnson Estate, 
228 Pac. 7 -!8. When the facts in the Johnson case are care-
fullv examined it will be seen that there is a distinction 
between the facts in that case and the facts in George vs. 
Robison, supra, and in the case at bar. In the first place 
the water right consisting of 56~ shares, and the land upon 
which it had been used were both owned by Olaus John-
son, the testator. 
It must also be remembered that the Johnson case in-
volved the construction of a will. And the rule is well 
settled by statute, Sections 101-2-1, 101-2-2, U.C.A. 1943 
(sections 6347, 6348), Comp. Laws of Utah, 1917 that-
"A will is to be construed according to the intention of 
the testator. Where his intention can not have effect to 
its full extent, it must have effect as far as possible." 
(Section 101-2-1 ). '1n case of uncertainty arising upon 
the face of a will as to the application of any of its pro-
visions, the testator's intention is to be ascertained from 
the words of the will, taking into view the circumstances 
under which it was made, exclusive of his oral declara-
tions." (Section 101-2-2). 
The court in re Johnson's Estate also distinguished 
the facts in that case from George vs. Robison, 63 P. 819, 
in the following language -
"But we think the decision itself is distinguishable, 
in part at least, on account of the peculiar facts in the 
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case and the conclusion reached. In George vs. 
Robison - 'the water rights were not owned by the 
grantor in the deed, but were owned by a third 
person.'" · 
The same is true in the case at bar. When Catharine 
Gibbons and John Andersen conveyed the land to plain-
tiff, they did not own the water in question, but it was 
owned by the Estate of Andrew Andersen, deceased. It 
must also be observed that the decision in the case in re 
Johnson's Estate, supra, expressly stated that the general 
rule stated in George vs. Robison, supra, should not be 
modified but only "when applied to a case like in re 
Johnson's Estate." And in a subsequent decision rendered 
by this Court in Black vs. Johansen, 18 P. 2d. 901, a 
further distinction was noted between the facts in the cases 
of Snyder vs. Murdock and George vs. Robison, and the 
facts in re Johnson's Estate, 64 Utah, 114, 228 P. 748, and 
in making this distinction the late Mr. Justice Straup 
speaking for this Court said: "The cited cases of Snyder 
vs. Murdock, 20 Utah, 419, 59 P. 91; and George vs. Robi-
sofl 23 Utah 79, 63 P. 819, are not in conflict her~with. 
They involve different facts." 
On page 10 of respondent's brief the case of Cortella 
vs. Salt Lake City, 72 P. 2nd 630, is cited. It is respect-
fully submitted that this case does not support respond-
ent's judgment. The undisputed facts in that case show 
that the water right in question was not represented hy 
shares of stock in a corporation. The plaintiff, Cortella, 
contended that the land which he acquired by mesne con-
veyances from the Preece heirs, had appurtenant to it a 
water right in Parley's Canyon Creek. The trial court 
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found in favor of Cortella's clain1, but on appeal, the 
judgment was reversed. The following staten1ent by this 
Court illustrates that the question involved in that case 
was entirely different from the instant case. In dealing 
with that distinction this Court stated- "\Ve are not deal-
ing with water as personal property:~ ( Italics added) . 
Respondent's counsel attempts to discredit the opin-
ion of the Supreme Court of Colorado in Oppenlander vs. 
Left Hand Ditch Company reported in 31 Pac. 854, be-
cause it was not cited by this Court in George vs. Robison, 
23 Utah, 79. 63 Pac. 819. Regardless of that omission the 
Colorado case is nevertheless in point as an authority in 
support of the holding of this Court in George vs. Robison, 
supra. 
The writer desires to call this Courts attention to 
another Colorado case, viz., First National Bank vs. Hast-
ings 42 Pac. 691, which is cited among appellant's authori-
ties in the opinion of this Court in George vs. Robison. In 
holding that a water right represented by shares of stock 
in an incorporated irrigation company is not appurtenant 
to the land upon which it has been used, Justice Thomson 
said: 
"For the purpose of showing a transfer to the inter-
veners of title to ditch stock, they introduced in 
evidence, against the plaintiff's objection, a deed ex-
ecuted to them by Dickson on May 1, 1891, conveying 
to them a certain tract of land, and all the water rights 
in any way pertaining or belonging to the land. The 
deed was improperly received. Water rights belong-
ing to land and stock in a ditch corporation are two 
essentially different kinds of property. A real-estate 
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owner may have the right to water for the purpose of 
irrigating his land without owning any ditch stock, 
and a stockholder in a ditch company may be without 
right to water for irrigation or without land, to irri-
gate.. Water rights for irrigation are regarded as real 
property, and shares of stock in a corporation are 
personal property. The deed conveyed all rights in 
water pertaining to the land described for the purpose 
of its irrigation, but it no more conveyed the grantor's 
water stock than . it conveyed his horses." (Italics 
supplied). 
In a later Colorado case, Oligarchy Ditch Company 
et. al. vs. Farm lnv. Company, 88 Pac. 443, the water right 
was represented by shares of stock in Oligarchy Ditch 
Company, a corporation. It is submitted that the rule 
adhered to in that case, is applicable in the case at bar. 
Mr. Justice Bailey, speaking for the Court said: 
"While there are many cases which hold that a 
water right or a private ditch may pass with a con-
veyance of land as appurtenant thereto, yet we know 
of no case, and counsel has called our attention to 
none, wherein it is held that a corporation owning a 
ditch, and furnishing the right to carry water to its 
stockholders only, must continue to carry water for 
land which has been conveyed to a stranger, while 
the stock which gave the right remained in the hands 
of the original owner or had been transferred to other 
parties." 
The last clause of the foregoing quotation is certainly 
in point with the facts in the instant case, since the title 
to the lands passed from Sophia Andersen, through three 
parties to the plaintiff, while the ownership in the water 
stock remained in the estate of Andrew Andersen, de-
ceased. 
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On page 11 of respondent's brief it is contended that 
the water used upon the land prior to the incorporation of 
the :\lendon Central Irrigation Company, was not severed 
from the land. Counsel contends that although the sever-
ance deed (defendant's Ex. 1) was executed by Andrew 
and Sophia Andersen, and delivered to the officers of the 
Company, and in consideration for which the Corporation 
issued the stock, to Andrew Andersen, yet because water 
from the Canal has been used upon land, the water repre-
sented by said certificate is appurtenant to the land. This 
contention is contrary to the holding of this Court in 
George vs. Robison and Snyder vs. :Murdock. 
The fact that heirs of Andrew Andersen did not earlier 
probate his estate is immaterial- The water was used by 
his wife, son and daughter, and the other heirs permitted 
them to use the water, but at most this was a pet:missive 
use - and moreover, it being personal property, it could 
not be appurtenant to the land and hence could not be 
subject for a quiet title action. 
It is a matter of common knowledge with the bench 
and bar that some estates, involving real and personal 
property, are not probated for many years after the death 
of the decedent. 
On page 13 of respondent's brief, the case of East 
River Bottom water Company vs. Boyce, 128 P. 2d. 277 is 
cited. It is conceded in the opinion in that case, that a 
Deed of Waters Rights, similar to defendant's Ex. 1, was 
not executed by the incorporators and their wives. See 
pages 15-17 of appellant's brief for a distinction between 
that case and the case at bar. 
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It is respectfully urged that the decision rendered by 
this Court in Adamson vs. Brockbank 185 P. 2d. 264 is not 
in point. The facts in that case are dissimilar. In that 
case the irrigation ditch over plaintiffs land had been used 
for more than 20 years - to convey water to adjoining 
lands owned by plaintiffs. When defendant destroyed the 
ditch, plaintiffs sued for damages. It did not involve a 
water right, but an easement right to convey water through 
the ditch to plaintiff's lands, which right was held to be 
appurtenant to their land. 
It is respectfully submitted that the holding by the 
Supreme Court of Montana in Yellowtsone Valley Comp-
any vs. Associated Mortgagors Investors, 290 P. 255, does 
not support plaintiff's action in the instant case. The 
Montana Court held that under the circumstances in that 
case, the water right was appurtenant to the land, but 
because of the foreclosure - "the plaintiff had no right, 
title, or interest in either the land or water stock." 
Under similar facts in the case of Bank of Visalia vs. 
Smith (Cal. ) 81 Pac. 542, the Supreme Court of California 
held contrary to the Montana Court. The facts in the 
California case are very similar to the facts in George vs. 
Robison, 63 Pac. 819. The California Court held that -
"Shares of stock, as such, are not presumptively appurten-
ant to land." 
Point No. II. The court erred in finding and holding, 
that the water intended to be and represented by the said 
112 shares of said capital stock, and the water so used 
upon said lands is one and the same identical water, and 
that said water was never by any owner thereof either 
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seve·red or intended to be severed frmn said lands, or used 
otherwise than for the irrigation of said lands described 
in the findings and decree. 
Respondent's counsel directs his argument to the last 
clause of the above point, and argues that, "the water was 
never by any owner thereof either severed or intended to 
be severed from the lands." The case of East River Bottom 
Water Company, 128 P. 2d. 277 is again referred to, but 
that case has been distinguished in this brief, and it was 
also distinguished at pages 15-17 of appellants brief, to 
which reference is hereby made. 
It is contended that because the record title to the 
Andersen property was in Sophia Andersen, that the stock 
should not have been issued to Andrew Andersen, but 
Should have been issued to Sophia. This question has 
already been discussed. Suppose that the stock certificate 
No. 24 as it now stands was in the name of Sophia instead 
of Andrew. Just how that could benefit the plaintiff is 
difficult to perceive in view of the fact that the heirs at 
law of Sophia and Andrew are identical. Plaintiff has 
produced no evidence showing she would be in a pre-
ferable position had the stock certificate No. 24 been is-
sued to Sophia instead of Andrew. 
On page 21 of respondent's brief it is contended that-
"It cannot be presumed he wanted her to have the land 
and not the water with it, if so he would not have con-
veyed the 2.50 acre tract to her. When this deed was 
executed to Sophia on July 23, 1918, Andrew was the 
owner of the 112 shares of capital stock of the Irrigation 
Company, which was issued to him on April30, 1918. And 
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prior thereto Andrew and Sophia had jointly transferred 
the appurtenance rights in the water to the Irrigation 
Company, by their execution of the Deed of Water Rights 
( Def' s. Ex. 1.) 
Point No. III. The court erred in finding and hold-
ing that the said water stock certificates never has been 
and is not now personal property separate and apart from 
said lands, or even so considered. 
Respondent's argument under point 3, revolves 
around the ownership of the stock. Mr. Sorensen, secre-
tary of the Water Company testified, ( R. 44) that the 
signature of Andrew Andersen, appears on stub of certifi-
cate No. 24, which acknowledges that he received the 
certificate, and that so far as the Corporation is concerned, 
Andrew Andersen's estate is the owner of the stock. 
( R. 45) . There is no evidence offered by plaintiff to 
dispute this fact. The fact that the certificate has been 
misplaced or lost is not material. The evidence show that 
Andrew Andersen received it, and no other certificate 
has been issued in its place. Moreover, the secretary 
of the Corporation testified that the Company recognized 
Andrew Andersen's estate as the owner of the stock. Much 
of what is stated by Counsel on pages 23-25 of respondent's 
brief is answered by appellant's brief pages 17-20. 
On pages 6 and 7 of respondent's brief, Counsel in-
dulges in the assumption that Andrew Andersen must 
have assigned this stock to his wife, Sophia. If that 
actually occurred, then why didn't Sophia present the 
certificate No. 24, to the secretary and procure a new cer-
tificate? But just how such an assumption is material is 
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difficult to perceive. If Sophia did have a certificate why 
did she not assign the same to her son, L. ~1., when she 
conveyed the lands to him on November 26,1922 (Ab. l.t) 
and o~ January 2--L 1924, (A b. 15). A water right is not 
mentioned in either of these deeds. The only assumption 
permissable is that Andrew Andersen's wife, Sophia, and 
their son, L. ~I. knew that the water stock was issued to 
Andrew Andersen, and that on account of his demise the 
stock could not be transferred, except by probate, and so 
they continued to use the water, in the absence of any 
objection from the other children. 
Point No. IV. The court erred in finding and holding 
that the Mendon Central Irrigation Company, is a tnutual 
company and that the interest in the water was conveyed 
with the land as an appurtenance. 
By counsel's remarks under this point on page 26 of 
respondent's brief, it is conceded that the water right 
owned by other land owners under the Mendon Central 
Irrigation Company were transferred by the issuance of 
a new certificate or certificates in lieu of the old certificate. 
Counsel says, that - "Nothing irregular is seen in issuing 
of new certificates in lieu of old ones." How does this 
admission square with plaintiff's failure to prove that in 
the instant case, there has been no transfer of the 112 
shares issued to Andrew Andersen, as evidenced by the 
stub No. 24. Plaintiff's entire case is predicated upon the 
proposition that because certain water has been used to 
irrigate the Andersen lands, which is now owned by plain-
tiff, that the mere use of water from the canal, ipso facto, 
amounted to a transfer of the legal title to the water, 
represented by Certificate No. 24. 
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Point V. The court erred in finding and holding that 
plaintiff is entitled to an order declaring her to be the 
owner of water right represented by the certificates of 
stock number 24, and that another certificate of stock be 
issued to plaintiff in lieu thereof for 112 shares of the capi-
tal stock of the Mendon Central Irrigation Company. 
It appears from respondent's brief, page 27, that 
there is a failure to answer appellant's contention on page 
23 of it's brief to the effect that in view of the fact that 
plaintiff's pleadings and testimony attempts to show that 
plaintiff acquired title to the lands, and her theory was 
that a mere use of the water entitled plaintiff to a judg-
ment, decreeing to her the water on the theory that it was 
appurtenant to the land. However, even though this was 
plaintiff's theory as reflected by her pleadings and evi-
dence, it is evident that plaintiff has now concluded that 
in order to procure legal title to the water, she must have 
a certificate of stock issued to her by the Mendon Central 
Irrigation Company. The plaintiff's entire case rests upon 
the theory of ownership based upon an appurtenance 
right; however, under point V she is now completely 
changing her theory, to ownership evidenced by a 
certificate of stock. Manifestly, from plaintiff's complaint 
and her evidence, it all points to the fact that the water is 
appurtenant to the land and is thus considered as real 
property, but no doubt plaintiff realizes that she could 
not own water under such a right when the remaining 
ownership to the water under the system is evidenced by 
certificates of stock held by the remaining stockholders 
of the Corporation. 
Point No. VI. The court erred in nwking and enter-
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ing its finding four ( R. 11) since the action therein re-
ferred to involved different property and different issues. 
Respondent does not explain why findings No. 4 was 
included in the findings in as much as the court sustained 
appellant's objection to the introduction of the opinion 
rendered by this court in Gibbons vs. Brimm, 230 P. 2d. 
983, at the time it was offered during the trial. ( R. 39). 
It is very evident that respondent attempted in every way 
possible to prejudice the trial court against the defendant 
during the trial by attempting to enlist the court's sym-
pathy by attempting to show that she had incurred an 
obligation. However, in view of the fact that the decision 
in this case was drawn to the attention of the court it could 
very likely have had a direct bearing upon the decision of 
the trial court in the case at bar. In view of the fact that 
the appellant did bring this case to the attention of the 
trial court, it should be kept in mind that there was in-
cluded in the opinion of this court in that case another 
transaction involving a note for $8000, secured by mort-
gage to which the plaintiff had an assignment and has 
since received the proceeds owing on that indebtedness, 
which the trial court apparently overlooked. It is difficult 
to understand why the respondent brought this extraneous 
matter before the court since it has no legal relation to 
the issues involved in the case at bar. The subject matter 
in this action is a separate and distinct property right 
belonging to the estate of Andrew Andersen, deceased, 
and it should not in any way be affected by transactions 
occurring between the plaintiff and Catherine Gibbons. 
Point No. VII. The court erred in rendering its judg-
ment and decree that the water represented by the 112 
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shares of capital stock in the Mendon Central Irrigation 
Company, a corporation is appurtenant to the lands des-
cribed in said decree, and that plaintiff is the legal and 
equitable owner of said water - and that the said Mendon 
Central Irrigation Company, be directed to issue to plain-
tiff a certificate for 112 shares of stock to replace the 
certificate issued to Andrew Andersen, deceased, in his 
lifetime, and the court further erred in rendering its further 
judgment and decree; that the Cache Valley Banking 
Company, administrator of the Estate of Andrew Ander-
sen, deceased, nor any of the heirs at law of his estate have 
no interest, ownership or title in either the water, or Cer-
tificate of Stock covering the same, or any part thereof, 
and that the plaintiff's title therto is good and valid and is 
quieted in her, and that the administrator and heirs of the 
estate of Andrew Andersen, are estopped, enfoined, and 
-restrained from asserting any right, title or interest what-
soever in said water or stock covering same. 
Respondent's counsel in his attempt to answer appel-
lant's complaint to the court's findings, No. 7, page 27 of 
appellant's brief;again indicated that plaintiff's sole claim 
to his water is based upon an appurtant water right. This 
claim is made in the very face of the undisputed facts that 
the water right in question is represented by 112 shares of 
stock issued by the Mendon Central Irrigation Company, 
a Corporation, which is held by this court to be personal 
property. It is respectfully submitted that the cases cited 
by respondent's counsel have in this brief been disting-
uished from the case at bar. Counsel erroneously contends 
that the cases of Snyder vs Murdock, 50 Pac. 9, and George 
ves. Robison, 63 Pac. 819, were over-ruled by the decision 
in re Johnson's estate. This court held in Black vs. Johan-
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sen 18. 2d. 901, that the decision in re Johnson's estate 
was distinguishe# the cases of George vs. Robison and 
Snyder vs. ~1urdock, on the ground that they involved 
different facts. 
Counsel concedes that the present action is one 
to quiet title. At the time when this action was 
brought Section 104-57-1. U.C.A. 1943, was in force 
and effect, and it provides that,- "An action may be 
brought by any person against another who claims an 
estate or interest in real property adverse to him for the 
purpose of determining such adverse claim." 
Our statute which was in force when this action was 
brought, Section 18-2-33, 1943, provides among other 
things, that,- "Stock shall be deemed personal property." 
It is next contended that the use of the water by the 
heirs of Andrew Anderson, deceased, since his death was 
not permissive. This statement is squarely contrary to 
the evidence. Sophia Andersen, L. M. Andersen, and 
Catherine Gibbons, were permitted to use water on said 
lands through the forebearance of the remaining heirs of 
Andrew Andersen, deceased. 
This is simply a case where one heir is attempting 
to appropriate to herself property that belongs equally to 
herself and the remaining eight heirs of said estate. 
The defendant and appellant respectfully submits 
to this Honorable Court that the findings, conclusions 
and judgment of the lower court be reversed, set aside 
and held for naught, and for costs on this appeal. 
Respectfully submitted, 
L. E. NELSON, 
Attorney for Defendant 
and Appellant. 
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